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Lexicographic choice functions without
archimedeanicity
Arthur Van Camp1, Enrique Miranda2, and Gert de Cooman1
Abstract We investigate the connection between choice functions and lexico-
graphic probabilities, by means of the convexity axiom considered by [7] but
without imposing any Archimedean condition. We show that lexicographic
probabilities are related to a particular type of sets of desirable gambles,
and investigate the properties of the coherent choice function this induces
via maximality. Finally, we show that the convexity axiom is necessary but
not sufficient for a coherent choice function to be the infimum of a class of
lexicographic ones.
Key words: Choice functions, lexicographic probabilities, archimedeanicity,
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1 Introduction
A prominent decision model under uncertainty is that of choice functions [5].
To be able to deal with imprecise information, Seidenfeld et al. proposed an
axiomatisation of coherent choice functions in [7] that generalised Rubin’s [5]
to allow for incomparability. They also established a representation theorem
of coherent choice functions by means of probability/utility pairs.
From an imprecise probabilities perspective, choice functions can be seen
as a more general model than sets of desirable gambles, because preferences
are not uniquely determined by pairwise comparisons between options. We
investigated this idea in [10], and in particular we studied the connections
between choice functions and the notions of desirability and indifference. In
order to do so, we applied the above-mentioned axiomatisation [7] to gambles
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instead of horse lotteries, and also removed two axioms: (i) the Archimedean
one, because it prevents choice functions from modelling the preferences cap-
tured by coherent sets of desirable gambles; and (ii) the convexity axiom,
because that is incompatible with maximality as a decision rule, something
that is closely tied in with coherent sets of desirable gambles. Although this
alternative axiomatisation is more general, it also has the drawback of not
leading to a Rubinesque representation theorem, or in other words, to a strong
belief structure [2].
In the present paper, we add more detail to our previous findings [10] by
investigating in more detail the implications of the convexity axiom, while
still letting go of archimedeanicity. We show that, if a Rubinesque repre-
sentation theorem were possible, it would involve lexicographic probabilities,
but that unfortunately such a representation is not generally guaranteed. In
establishing this, we derive some properties of coherent choice functions in
terms of their so-called rejection sets.
The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we provide the basics
of the theory of choice functions that we need for the rest of the paper.
The connection with lexicographic probabilities and the connection with a
representation theorem is addressed in Section 3. Some additional comments
and remarks are provided in Section 4. Due to limitations of space, many of
the proofs have been omitted.
2 Coherent choice functions
Consider a finite possibility space X in which a random variable X takes
values. We denote by L the set of all gambles—real-valued functions—on X .
Typically, a gamble f(X) is interpreted as an uncertain reward: if the actual
outcome turns out to be x in X , then the subject’s capital changes by f(x).
For any two gambles f and g, we write f ≤ g when f(x) ≤ g(x) for all x inX , and we write f < g when f ≤ g and f ≠ g. We collect all gambles f for
which f > 0 in L>0.
For a subset O of L, we define its positive hull as posi(O) ∶= {∑nk=1 λkfk ∶
n ∈ N, λk ∈ R>0, fk ∈ O} ⊆ L, and its convex hull as CH(O) ∶= {∑nk=1 αkfk ∶ n ∈
N, αk ∈ R≥0,∑nk=1 αk = 1, fk ∈ O} ⊆ L, where R>0 (R≥0) is the set of all positive
(non-negative) real numbers. For any two subsets O1 and O2 of L and any λ
in R, we let λO1 ∶= {λf ∶ f ∈ O1} and O1 +O2 ∶= {f + g ∶ f ∈ O1, g ∈ O2}.
We denote by Q the set of all non-empty finite subsets of L. Elements O
of Q are the option sets amongst which a subject can choose his preferred
options.
Definition 1. A choice function C is a map C∶Q→ Q∪{∅}∶O ↦ C(O) such
that C(O) ⊆ O.
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The interpretation is that a choice function C selects the set C(O) of ‘best’
options in the option set O. Our definition resembles the one commonly used
in the literature [1, 7, 9], except for a (also not unusual) restriction to finite
option sets [6, 8]. Equivalently to a choice function C, we consider its rejection
function R, defined R(O) ∶= O ∖C(O) for all O in Q. It returns the gambles
that are not selected by C.
In this paper, we focus on coherent choice functions.
Definition 2. We call a choice function C on Q coherent if for all O,O1,O2
in Q, f, g in L and λ in R>0:
C1. C(O) ≠ ∅;
C2. if f < g then {g} = C({f, g});
C3. a. if C(O2) ⊆ O2 ∖O1 and O1 ⊆ O2 ⊆ O then C(O) ⊆ O ∖O1;
b. if C(O2) ⊆ O1 and O ⊆ O2 ∖O1 then C(O2 ∖O) ⊆ O1;
C4. a. if O1 ⊆ C(O2) then λO1 ⊆ C(λO2);
b. if O1 ⊆ C(O2) then O1 + {f} ⊆ C(O2 + {f}).
These axioms are a subset of the ones studied by Seidenfeld et al. [7], trans-
lated from horse lotteries to gambles. We have not included the Archimedean
axiom, which makes our definition more general. This is important in order
to make the connection with the sets of desirable gambles we recall below.
In this paper, we intend to investigate in some detail the implications of
an additional axiom in [7], namely
C5. if O ⊆ O1 ⊆ CH(O) then C(O) ⊆ C(O1) for all O and O1 in Q,
also referred to as the convexity axiom. One useful property we shall have
occasion to use further on is the following:
Proposition 1. Let C be a choice function on L satisfying C3a, C4a and C5.
Then for any n ∈ N, f1, f2, . . . , fn ∈ L and λ1, λ2, . . .λn ∈ R>0:
0 ∈ C({0, f1, f2, . . . , fn})⇔ 0 ∈ C({0, λ1f1, λ2f2, . . . , λnfn}).
For two choice functions C and C ′, we call C not more informative than
C ′—and we write C ⊑ C ′—if C(O) ⊇ C ′(O) for all O in Q. The binary
relation ⊑ is a partial order, and for any collection C′ of choice functions, its
infimum inf C′ exists, and is given by inf C′(O) = ⋃C∈C′ C(O) for all O in Q.
Coherence is preserved under arbitrary infima [10, Proposition 3], and it is
easy to show that so is convexity:
Proposition 2. For any collection C′ of choice functions that satisfy C5, its
infimum inf C′ satisfies C5 as well.
One important way of defining coherent choice functions is by means of
sets of desirable gambles. This connection is explored in some detail in [10]. A
set of desirable gambles D is simply a subset of the vector space of gamblesL. The underlying idea is that a subject finds every gamble f in her set
of desirable gambles strictly better than the status quo—she has a strict
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preference for the uncertain reward f over 0. As we did for choice functions,
we pay special attention to coherent sets of desirable gambles, see for instance
[3] for a detailed discussion.
Definition 3 ([3]). A set of desirable gambles D is called coherent when
D = posi(D∪L>0) and 0 ∉D. We collect all coherent sets of desirable gambles
in the set D¯.
We may associate with any D ∈ D¯ a strict partial order ½D on L, by letting
f ½D g⇔ 0 ½D g−f ⇔ g−f ∈D, so D = {f ∈ L ∶ 0 ½D f}; see for instance [3].
This correspondence is one-to-one.
We may also associate with a coherent set of desirable gambles D a choice
function CD based on maximality. For any O in Q, we let CD(O) be the set
of gambles that are undominated, or maximal, in O:
CD(O) ∶= {f ∈ O ∶ (∀g ∈ O)g − f ∉D} = {f ∈ O ∶ (∀g ∈ O)f /½D g}.
Interestingly, the coherent choice function CD associated with a coherent
set of desirable gambles D need not satisfy C5:
Proposition 3. For any coherent set of desirable gambles D, its correspond-
ing choice function CD satisfies C5 if and only posi(Dc) =Dc.
3 Lexicographic choice functions
Let D¯L ∶= {D ∈ D¯ ∶ posi(Dc) =Dc}. It follows from [4, Proposition 6] that a set
of gambles D ∈ D¯L induces a linear prevision—an expectation operator with
respect to a finitely additive probability—by means of the formula PD(f) ∶=
sup{µ ∈ R ∶ f −µ ∈D} for all f in L. We can make an even tighter connection
with the so-called lexicographic probabilities.
A lexicographic probability system is an `-tuple p = (p1, . . . , p`) of prob-
ability mass functions on X . We associate with p its expectation operator
Ep = (Ep1 , . . . ,Ep`), and its preference relation ≺ on L:
f ≺ g⇔ Ep(f) <L Ep(g) for all f and g in L,
where <L denotes the usual lexicographic order between `-tuples.
Proposition 4. Given a lexicographic probability system (p1, . . . , p`), the set
of desirable gambles D ∶= {f ∈ L ∶ 0 ≺ f} associated with the preference relation≺ is an element of D¯L. Conversely, given a set of desirable gambles D in D¯L,
its associated preference relation ½D is a preference relation based on some
lexicographic probability system.
Because of this result, we refer to the elements of D¯L as lexicographic sets of
desirable gambles, and call the elements of C¯L ∶= {CD ∶ D ∈ D¯L} lexicographic
choice functions.
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We gather from the discussion in Section 2 that the infimum of any set of
lexicographic choice functions satisfies Axioms C1–C5. The central question
that remains now, is whether any choice function that satisfies Axioms C1–
C5 is, conversely, an infimum of lexicographic choice functions. Such a rep-
resentation result would make lexicographic choice functions fulfil the role
of ‘dually atomic’ choice functions in our theory without the Archimedean
axiom, in analogy with the theory with an Archimedean axiom [7], where
the dually atomic choice functions are the ones induced by probability mass
functions—see [2] for the terminology. In other words, we study the following:
Is, in parallel with the result in [7], every choice function C that satisfies
Axioms C1–C5 an infimum of lexicographic choice functions, or in other
words, is C(O) = ⋃{C ′(O) ∶ C ′ ∈ C¯L,C ⊑ C ′} for all O in Q?
We now show that this is not the case. In our counterexample, we focus on
a binary space X = {a, b}. It follows from the axioms of coherence that any
coherent choice function C on a binary possibility space X can be determined
by two sets: its associated set of desirable gambles DC ∶= {f ∈ L ∶ {f} =
C{0, f}} and a so-called rejection set K, which consists of the gambles g inLII and h in LIV which, taken alone, do not allow us to reject 0, but taken
together, do allow us to reject 0:
0 ∈ C({0, g}), 0 ∈ C({0, h}), and 0 ∈ R({0, g, h}).
Here LIV ∶= {h ∈ L ∶ h(a) < 0 and h(b) > 0} constitutes the second, andLIV ∶= {h ∈ L ∶ h(a) > 0 and h(b) < 0} the fourth quadrant, in the two-
dimensional vector space L.
In order to construct our counterexample, consider some increasing subset
K of R>0 × R<0, and use it to define a special choice function CK , with
rejection function RK , as follows. First of all, for any option set O, we let
0 ∈ RK({0} ∪O) if and only if
O∩L>0 ≠ ∅ or (∃λ1, λ2 ∈ R>0)(∃(ρ1, ρ2) ∈K){λ1(−1, ρ1), λ2(1, ρ2)} ⊆ O. (1)
Of course, this will define a choice function CK uniquely, provided that we
require that CK should satisfy Axiom C4b, because then, for any O ∈ Q and
any f ∈ O:
f ∈ RK(O)⇔ 0 ∈ RK({0} ∪O′), (2)
where O′ ∶= (O − {f}) ∖ {0}.
Proposition 5. Any choice function CK that is defined by Equations (1)–(2)
satisfies Axioms C1, C2, C3a, C4a and C4b.
As far as C5 is concerned, we have established the following:
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Proposition 6. Consider any increasing K ⊆ R>0×R<0. For the choice func-
tion CK on X = {a, b} defined by Equations (1)–(2), the following statements
are equivalent:
(i) CK satisfies C5.
(ii) (∀(κ1, κ2) ∈ R>0 ×R<0)(κ1 + κ2 > 0⇒ (κ1, κ2) ∈K).
Now, let us consider the set K as depicted in the figure below. Let CK be
Fig. 1 The rejection set







the choice function associated with this set by means of Equations (1)–(2).
It follows from the discussion above that this CK satisfies Axioms C1, C2,
C3a, C4a, C4b and C5. Let us show that it also satisfies Axiom C3b.
Proposition 7. CK satisfies Axiom C3b. As a consequence, it is a coherent
choice function that satisfies C5.
Proof. It can be checked that Axiom C3b is equivalent to
(∀O ∈ Q,∀g ∈ O){0, g} ⊆ R(O)⇒ 0 ∈ R(O ∖ {g}).
So assume that {0, g} ⊆ RK(O). Then g ∈ RK(O) and there are (κ1, κ2) ∈K
such that {λ1(−1, κ1), λ2(1, κ2)} ⊆ O for some λ1 and λ2 in R>0.
If g ≠ λ1(−1, κ1) and g ≠ λ2(1, κ2) then 0 ∈ RK(O ∖ {g}) and we are done,
so assume that g = λ1(−1, κ1) or g = λ2(1, κ2).
If g = λ1(−1, κ1), then 0 ∈ RK(O−{g}), so there are (κ′1, κ′2) ∈K such that{g + λ′1(−1, κ′1), g + λ′2(1, κ′2)} ⊆ O for some λ′1 and λ′2 in R>0, implying that{(−λ1 − λ′1, λ1κ1 + λ′1κ′1), (−λ1 + λ′2, λ1κ1 + λ′2κ′2)} ⊆ O.
We now have a number of possibilities for the K defined in the figure
above.
First of all, (λ1κ1+λ′1κ′1
λ1+λ′1 , κ2) ∈K under any of the following conditions:
(i) κ2 > −1;
(ii) κ2 ∈ (−2,−1] (so κ1 ≥ 1) and κ′1 ≥ 1;
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(iii) κ2 = −2 (so κ1 > 1) and κ′1 ≥ 1;
(iv) κ2 < −2 (so κ1 > 2) and κ′1 ≥ 2.
So, in any of these cases, we see that 0 ∈ RK({(−1, λ1κ1+λ′1κ′1λ1+λ′1 ),0, (1, κ2)}),
and therefore also 0 ∈ R({g+λ′1(−1, κ′1),0, λ2(1, κ2)}), by Proposition 1. Since
λ′1(−1, κ′1) ≠ 0, we infer from Axiom C3a that indeed 0 ∈ RK(O ∖ {g}).
The remaining two possibilities are:
(v) κ2 ≤ −1 (so κ1 ≥ 1) and κ′1 < 1 (so κ′2 > −1);
(vi) κ2 < −2 (so κ1 > 2) and κ′1 ∈ [1,2) (so κ′2 ≥ −2).
There are now three possible cases.
If λ1 = λ′2, then λ1κ1 + λ′2κ′2 = λ1(κ1 + κ′2) > 0 and therefore also(−λ1 + λ′2, λ1κ1 + λ′2κ′2) > 0, whence 0 ∈ RK({0, (−λ1 + λ′2, λ1κ1 + λ′2κ′2)}),
by Axiom C2.
If λ1 < λ′2, then (κ′1, λ1κ1+λ′2κ′2−λ1+λ′2 ) ∈K, and therefore also
0 ∈ RK({(−1, κ′1),0, (1, λ1κ1 + λ′2κ′2−λ1 + λ′2 )}).
Proposition 1 now guarantees that also
0 ∈ RK({(−λ′1, λ′1κ′1),0, (−λ1 + λ′2, λ1κ1 + λ′2κ′2)}).
Since (−λ′1, λ′1κ′1) ≠ g = (−λ1, λ1κ1)—because κ1 ≥ 1 and κ′1 < 1, or κ1 > 2
and κ′1 < 2—, we infer from Axiom C3a that 0 ∈ RK(O ∖ {g}).
Finally, if λ1 > λ′2, then (λ1κ1+λ′2κ′2λ1−λ′2 , κ′2) ∈K, implying that
0 ∈ RK({(−1, λ1κ1 + λ′2κ′2
λ1 − λ′2 ),0, (1, κ′2)}).
Proposition 1 now guarantees that also
0 ∈ RK({(−λ1 + λ′2, λ1κ1 + λ′2κ′2),0, (λ′2, λ′2κ′2)}).
Since (−λ1 +λ′2, λ1κ1 +λ′2κ′2) ≠ g = (−λ1, λ1κ1), because λ′2 ≠ 0, we infer from
Axiom C3a that indeed 0 ∈ RK(O ∖ {g}).
The proof of the case that g = λ2(1, κ2) is similar. ⊓⊔
To see that our CK is not an infimum of lexicographic choice functions,
we use the following property:
Definition 4. Consider a coherent choice function C and its rejection set
K. Then C is called weakly Archimedean if for all f ∈ LII and g ∈ LIV with
posi({f, g}) ∩L≥0 = ∅:
(∀ ∈ R>0)(0 ∈ R({f + ,0, g}) ∩R({f,0, g + }))⇒ 0 ∈ R({f,0, g}).
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We use this name because the property is a strictly weaker version of the
Archimedean condition in [7, Axioms 3a and 3b]; it still fulfils the role of a
continuity condition, but is weak enough to be still compatible with desir-
ability, a non-Archimedean strict preference.
Proposition 8. An infimum of a non-empty set of lexicographic choice func-
tions is weakly Archimedean.
We now see that our choice function CK from Proposition 7 is not an infi-
mum of lexicographic choice functions, because it is not weakly Archimedean:
note that {(1 + ,−2), (1,−2 + )} ⊆K for all  > 0, while (1,−2) ∉K.
4 Discussion
We have studied to which extent it is possible to have a theory of coherent
choice functions that (i) as a special case allows for choosing the maximal
options in the strict binary preference expressed by the notion of desirability
in imprecise probabilities—meaning that we must remove the Archimedean
axiom—, and that (ii) includes lexicographic probability systems as its basic
building blocks. We have shown that such a theory can perfectly well incor-
porate the convexity axiom from [7], but that this additional axiom is not
strong enough to warrant a representation theorem where every choice func-
tion is an infimum of lexicographic ones. It is still an open problem to uncover
additional axioms that will guarantee such representation. We suspect that
our weak archimedeanicity will play an important role in solving it.
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